

PGB

30 January 1963

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Interim Report

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12/4/60

1. As you said, much of the report seems more concerned with re-statement of the preconceived ideas of the [redacted] Committee than with subjective evaluation of their incomplete findings. The review (Attachment A), presumably drafted by [redacted], has a contradiction in para 6. b. where it says 25X1A9a in talking about uneven production that NIS material has not been consistent and it is of varying quality, after having said in para 4. c. of the same paper that productive changes could be made in the presentation so as to minimize academic stylization. The statements on page 4, para 3. b. attempt to direct the NIS away from lower planning and operational levels of the armed forces. This is reflected in his summary and his recommendations, para 4. i and recommendation 5. a. (1). The embassies, however, seemed almost unanimous in claiming that Chapter I - toward which the Program is to be mainly aimed - is used in the field primarily as a low-level briefing paper providing basic intelligence for operational missions.

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2. Turning now to [redacted] summary, recommendations 5. b. (1) through (3) are seen to closely parallel actions now being promoted by OBI, therefore I assume we should concur in these.

3. Authoritative "central point" recommended in para 5. b. (4) has been, since the authorization of the Program, the AD/BI as representative of the DD/I and in turn the DCI and as chairman of the NIS Committee and director of the NIS Program. The only way to make this central point more authoritative for the stated purpose would be to give the DCI command over DIA and State.

4. Recommendation 5. b. (5) perhaps could be agreed to in principle considering the fugitive nature of priorities impinged upon by counterinsurgency requirements and Presidential areas of interest.

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5. Recommendation 5. b. (6), undoubtedly [redacted] speaking, would be an excellent measure if feasible. It runs counter to one of the definitions I have of intelligence.

6. Para 5. b. (7) - the flexibility of NIS format and production called for here has been demonstrated during the years by numerous changes in the NIS Standard Instructions and by priority production (such as the recent expedited production of Sec 45 on Cuba and Sec 24 on East Germany).

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